

AD-A237 693



A RAND NOTE



2

Scandinavian NATO Policy:
The Next Five Years

John Lund

May 1990

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

Approved for public release;
Distribution Unlimited

RAND

91 6 26

91-03567



The research reported here was sponsored by the United States Air Force under Contract F49620-86-C-0008. Further information may be obtained from the Long Range Planning and Doctrine Division, Directorate of Plans, Hq USAF.

The RAND Publication Series: The Report is the principal publication documenting and transmitting RAND's major research findings and final research results. The RAND Note reports other outputs of sponsored research for general distribution. Publications of The RAND Corporation do not necessarily reflect the opinions or policies of the sponsors of RAND research.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER N-2957-AF	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) Scandinavian NATO Policy: The Next Five Years		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED interim
		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHOR(s) John Lund		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s) F49620-86-C-0008
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS The RAND Corporation 1700 Main Street Santa Monica, CA 90406		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Long Range Planning & Doctrine Div. (AF/XOX) Directorate of Plans, Ofc. DC/Plans & Operations Hq USAF Washington, DC 20301		12. REPORT DATE May 1990
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 39
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) unclassified
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report) No Restrictions		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) NATO Denmark Norway Deterrence Military Forces (Foreign)		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) see reverse side		

Based on reports from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, this Note assesses the future of Danish and Norwegian security policies and the probable internal and external factors that will influence them. In the next five years, Danish politics will be marked by instability as rapid disarmament and tension reduction are pursued. The somewhat more stable Norwegian political environment is also entering a period of uncertainty. However, the weakening of centrism in Norwegian politics should not undermine a traditional concern for arms control and reduced tensions in Europe. While neither Scandinavian nation is expected to take a leading role in the NATO policy debate, they will make clear their opposition to the modernization or expansion of nuclear forces. Although both Norway and Denmark may turn their attention increasingly toward regional or "Nordic" solutions, the importance of their sea-lanes to U.S. maritime interests will ensure a continued U.S. commitment to maintaining some form of security relationship with them.

A RAND NOTE

N-2957-AF

Scandinavian NATO Policy: The Next Five Years

John Lund

May 1990

Prepared for the
United States Air Force



Accession For	
NTIS GRA&I	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DTIC TAB	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification	
By	
Distribution/	
Availability Codes	
Avail and/or	Special
Dist	
A-1	

RAND

PREFACE

This is one of a series of seven RAND Notes written under Project AIR FORCE as part of the National Security Strategies Program, in a project entitled Theater Nuclear Deterrence After the INF Treaty, sponsored by the United States Air Force, Europe (USAFE). The issues of maintaining NATO deterrence are as political as they are military, making it important to analyze the potential alternative short-run NATO policies of major member nations. Each of these Notes was written independently, and they were discussed at a meeting that examined the implications of each national policy for the policies of the others. The resulting synthesis will be set forth in a future report. Although these Notes have been refined as a result of the meeting and the passage of time, they are essentially independent; each one makes alternative assumptions about other NATO partners rather than predicated its analysis of specifics from the other Notes.

This Note relies extensively on translations of Danish and Norwegian articles as they appear in reports of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service's Daily Reports for Western Europe. Unless otherwise noted, information concerning Norway and Denmark comes from those FBIS reports. The information cutoff date for this Note is December 31, 1989.

SUMMARY

This Note assesses the future of Danish and Norwegian security policies and the internal and external factors that will probably affect them. A five-year time frame has been chosen to coincide roughly with the term of the Bush administration. For the baseline analysis, this Note assumes that Soviet policy continues to permit a devolution of control in Eastern Europe and actively pursues conventional and nuclear arms control in Europe. A conventional arms control agreement is assumed to be signed and implemented during this time frame. The United States maintains a firm commitment to the Atlantic Alliance, including a nuclear commitment, despite reductions in American forces in Europe. Furthermore, this Note assumes that a separate West German state continues to exist and to be part of NATO and the European Community.

In the next five years, Danish politics will be marked by instability and divisiveness, a result of the nature of the Danish political constitution and the gradual collapse of the national consensus on security policy. Adjustments to the establishment of a unified European market will dominate the domestic political debate. In the security field, the debate will focus on how the nation and the NATO alliance should best respond to changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, with the majority favoring rapid disarmament and reducing tensions. Denmark will probably permit a slow erosion of its already minimal military capabilities. The remaining forces will assume an increasingly defensive posture, meaning that they will be limited to operations in Danish territory. Plausible changes in the assumptions about Soviet or allied policies are likely to push Denmark toward a smaller rather than a greater commitment to defense.

Norwegian politics have traditionally been more stable than Danish politics, primarily because of a different constitutional framework, but general voter apathy in recent years has created greater uncertainty in Norwegian policies. The 1989 elections resulted in substantially greater representation by the two extremist parties of the left and right (the Socialist Left and Progress parties) at the expense of the two leading mainstream parties (Labor and the Conservatives). The Conservatives have formed a minority government in coalition with the center-right parties, but it must rely on the support of the right-wing Progress party to maintain control. A Labor-Socialist Left coalition falls one vote short of a majority. This current parliament will remain until 1993. The weakening of the centrists and the diffusion of power in the parliament will make this a period of unprecedented instability for Norwegian politics.

Norwegian security policy has been made primarily by a coalition of moderate Labor Party members, the Conservatives, and pro-defense centrists; however, this coalition's ability to continue to set policy has been seriously undermined by the losses suffered by the Labor and Conservative parties in the 1989 election. Norway should remain a strong advocate of arms control and of reduced tensions in Europe, especially in the Nordic region. Norwegian forces will be well-equipped, but the overall size of the forces should decline slightly. A major shift in Norwegian policy would probably occur only if a very drastic change came in Soviet or allied policies—for instance, if Soviet or American forces, or both, were withdrawn from Europe. An important exception could arise over nuclear weapons on American ships in the Norwegian Sea, which still holds the potential to become a considerable public issue in Norway.

The Scandinavian NATO states will continue to be more reactors than leaders in alliance affairs. They will show an increasing willingness to openly state their disagreements with the policies of the major allies, but on the whole they are unlikely to be at the forefront of NATO policy debates. Under the baseline assumptions, both nations can be expected to oppose modernization of NATO's nuclear forces or of expanded deployments of American nuclear-armed cruise missiles in the Norwegian Sea. Both nations will favor a conventional arms control agreement in Europe, but Norway will remain concerned that the Soviet Union will not be obligated to reduce forces in Soviet territory adjacent to Norway. Overall, the most important determinants of their security policies over the next five years will most likely be external factors: Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and Germany.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author wishes to thank John Van Oudenaren for his thoughtful and thorough review of this Note. RAND colleagues Ronald Asmus, Richard Bitzinger, Robert Levine, and Timothy Webb all offered useful comments. Any remaining errors of fact or interpretation are the sole responsibility of the author.

CONTENTS

PREFACE	iii
SUMMARY	v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	vii
FIGURES	xi
Section	
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. KEY ASSUMPTIONS	3
The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe	3
U.S. Policy	4
The Nordic Connection	4
Policies of Other NATO Members	5
Economic Conditions	7
III. DANISH SECURITY POLICY: THE NEXT FIVE YEARS	8
General Political Conditions	8
Specific Issue Areas	11
Some Variations on the Likely Case	16
Conclusions	19
IV. NORWEGIAN SECURITY POLICY: THE NEXT FIVE YEARS	20
General Political Conditions	20
Specific Issue Areas	24
Some Variations on the Likely Case	31
Conclusions	34
V. CONCLUSIONS	35
BIBLIOGRAPHY	37

FIGURES

1. The Danish Parliament: 1987	9
2. The Danish Parliament: 1988	9
3. The Norwegian Parliament: 1981-1985	21
4. The Norwegian Parliament: 1985-1989	21
5. The Norwegian Parliament: 1989--	24

I. INTRODUCTION

Denmark and Norway hold an unusual position in NATO. Both have been dedicated members from the beginning of the alliance. Public support for membership in NATO is very high and growing; indeed, public support has often been much higher than it is in the United States. Yet undercurrents of neutralism have remained strong and have surfaced on several occasions. Both nations prohibit the permanent stationing of foreign troops or bases on their soil, and neither permits nuclear weapons in peacetime. Relations between these nations and the United States have been generally very good. Yet both countries have been the subject of American criticism over the last few years. Denmark has borne the brunt of American ire owing to its low level of defense spending and its tendency to object to NATO nuclear policies. Norway was attacked for failing to prevent the sale of advanced machinery to the Soviet Union by a partly state-owned arms manufacturer, allowing the Soviets to build quieter submarines. Furthermore, Norway was openly criticized in the report *Discriminate Deterrence* for allegedly obstructing American efforts to defend the region.¹

For many years, the United States had adopted a low profile policy toward the Scandinavian NATO nations, which suited Denmark and Norway just fine. These two nations pursued security policies that were adapted to their unique geopolitical situation. Security policy remained primarily the concern of a very small policymaking elite. The few disagreements that arose over the years were handled quietly and at low levels.

Beginning in the late 1970s, this situation gradually changed. The Soviets substantially expanded and modernized its forces on the Kola Peninsula. The U.S. Navy, especially in the 1980s under the leadership of John Lehman, focused new attention on the far north. The deployment of air- and sea-launched cruise missiles heightened concerns in Nordic Europe that the region would become a major arena in any superpower struggle. Meanwhile, the issues of the neutron bomb and deployment of the intermediate nuclear force awakened substantial opposition within the Danish and Norwegian publics to NATO nuclear policy. In the process, security issues became more important in the domestic political debate and were no longer simply a matter for small elites.

¹The report stated in part: "Defense of the northern region is dependent to a decisive degree on rapid reinforcement from the United States and the rest of NATO; yet, the increased restrictions on U.S. and NATO activities in Norway limit our ability to bring force to bear quickly in defense of the region." *Discriminate Deterrence*, 1988, pp. 67-68.

This Note assesses the prospects for Danish and Norwegian policies toward NATO through the mid-1990s, based on certain assumptions about the internal and external environment. It explicitly sets forth the assumptions made, then examines the likely course of Danish and Norwegian policies over the next several years. Next, plausible variations on these assumptions are pursued to determine what effect they might have.²

The following section provides the key assumptions underlying the analysis in this Note. Next, two sections offer projections of the policies of Denmark and Norway. They follow a common outline:

- General political conditions, as a background for discussion of security policy;
- Specific issue areas, including arms control negotiations, changes in conventional forces, theater-based nuclear deterrence, economic issues, and the structure of NATO;
- Some variations on the assumptions of the likely case and how changes in these could affect the analysis, including electoral variations, Soviet policy, and policies of NATO and other nations.
- Conclusions.

²This Note concentrates on events of recent years and the effect on security policies of changes in key domestic and external variables. For a more in-depth and historical RAND study of the domestic determinants of Danish and Norwegian security policies, see Bitzinger, 1989.

II. KEY ASSUMPTIONS

The following assumptions have been used for the analysis of both Danish and Norwegian security policies. These assumptions will be varied in the sections dealing with Denmark and Norway to show the sensitivity of national policies to these factors.

THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE

Soviet policy toward Europe—both East and West—remains the preeminent issue facing NATO. In the near term, Soviet policy will most likely proceed roughly as it has in the last few years under Gorbachev. Eastern Europe will continue to devolve away from Soviet control and Communist rule, and multiparty democracies will emerge. However, the Warsaw Pact is assumed to continue to maintain its current membership. Furthermore, the Baltic Republics stay within the Soviet Union and the central government does not resort to armed intervention.

Slow but real progress will be made on certain East-West security and arms control issues, with a gradual easing of tensions. A conventional arms control agreement ("CFE I") will feature rough parity at lower levels in major army and air force weapon systems. Additional reductions are possible, and the next five years will probably witness negotiations for reductions to as low as 50 percent of NATO's force levels of 1989.

Regarding Nordic Europe, the Soviet Union will continue to pursue a policy of isolating regional security issues from the general European context. The Soviets will make diplomatic and military gestures toward the region, such as unilateral troop reductions in border areas or elimination of some nuclear forces, in an effort to gain an easing of tensions and perhaps a regional agreement limiting military forces. The Soviets would especially like to see the region declared a nuclear-free zone.

Despite possible reductions in ground and short-range nuclear forces, one can expect the Soviet Union to continue to modernize its strategic and naval forces in and around the Kola Peninsula, increasing the military threat to the region. The Soviets continue to deploy their most modern air and naval forces to bases there. Even following major strategic or conventional arms control agreements, the Kola Peninsula will remain a vital strategic region for the Soviets.¹

¹See "Norway: Defense Minister: Military Threat Remains," FBIS-WEU-89-236, 11 December 1989, p.15; "Norway: Defense Chief Warns Against Weakening Northern Forces," FBIS-WEU-89-240, 15 December 1989, p. 23; "Norway: Military expert on Soviet Forces in North," FBIS-WEU-89-241, 18 December 1989, p. 19; Lund, 1989, pp. 1-3, 33-34. In 1989 alone, the Soviets have deployed a new

This Note assumes that Soviet gestures toward reduced tensions and apparent force reduction will be far more obvious to the general public than will modernizing their forces. This environment should provide diminishing public support in Denmark and Norway for increased defense spending or for modernized nuclear weapons in Europe.

U.S. POLICY

The Bush administration can be expected to maintain a strong commitment to Europe. As part of this commitment, the United States will continue to uphold the policy of nuclear deterrence. It will seek to push through modernization of NATO's nuclear and conventional weapons, although under conditions substantially different from those of the 1980s. The United States will resist efforts to change the U.S. Navy's policy of not disclosing whether ships are carrying nuclear weapons. The administration will proceed with conventional arms control negotiations, resulting in an agreement that mandates a slight reduction in American forces stationed in Europe. American defense budgets are assumed to decline in real terms. This will stabilize or even reduce American naval presence in the far north.² Burden-sharing will very likely remain a major issue, especially in the Congress. Concerns about the effects of 1992 and the specter of a economic Fortress Europa will reinforce this tendency.

THE NORDIC CONNECTION

A central element of Danish and Norwegian security policy since World War II has been the special influence of Finland and Sweden. Leaders throughout Scandinavia have described Nordic Europe as a unique region of low tensions and low levels of military forces in an otherwise tense Europe. This special condition was threatened by the proximity of overwhelming Soviet military force. The official stance of the Nordic states has been to maintain a balancing act between reassuring the Soviets that the region would not be the source of any military threat to Soviet interests and deterring Soviet aggression against themselves. However, Norway and Denmark recognized, from their World War II experience, that they were absolutely dependent on external reinforcements to successfully defend their territory if war did come. In pursuit of these conflicting objectives, Denmark and Norway abandoned their traditional neutrality and joined NATO, but they imposed upon

aircraft carrier, a new class of missile cruisers, and a new class of attack submarines. In the late 1980s, the Soviets built a new base for its Typhoon SSBNs only 50 km from the Norwegian border.

²The United States does not base any forces in Denmark or Norway since both countries have banned the presence of foreign troops or bases on their territory. Therefore, U.S. naval forces become the principal means by which an American military presence is felt in the Northern Region of NATO in peacetime.

themselves certain restraints on their membership. Both countries prohibit foreign troops or bases on their territory in peacetime (except during exercises), prohibit nuclear weapons, and restrict the operations of Allied forces in and around their territory during exercises.

In practice, the concerns on the part of Norway and Denmark to maintain a situation of "low tensions" has given the Soviet Union some influence on NATO policy. By placing pressure on Finland, the Soviet Union has been able at times to redirect Norwegian and Danish policies.³ This special pattern of influence and relationships will remain an important factor in Danish and Norwegian security policy. Both countries will continue to closely coordinate positions on a wide range of security issues. The general public in each country will be influenced by the debates in the other. Both countries will be affected by developments in Sweden and Finland. Gorbachev's visit to Finland in October 1989 and his announcement of some unilateral reductions in nuclear and conventional forces could have placed tremendous pressure on Denmark and Norway, but his speech was quickly overshadowed by events in East Germany. However, additional gestures toward the region could force the Danish and Norwegian governments to offer some concessions of their own.

One area that could have critical regional implications is the Soviet Baltic. In particular, Finnish and Swedish concerns about the situation in the Soviet Baltic republics could potentially create pressures on Norway and Denmark. This Note assumes that the Baltic republics remain within the Soviet Union; however, if the Soviet Union were to offer autonomy or independence to these republics conditional on a special regional defense agreement with Nordic Europe, the pressures on the Norwegian and Danish governments would be great.

POLICIES OF OTHER NATO MEMBERS

Undoubtedly, the most important NATO country to watch in the coming five years will be Germany. The events of late 1989 have made the prospects of full German reunification by the end of 1991 a near certainty. Even before the ouster of East German leader Honecker and the fall of the Berlin Wall, West Germany had become increasingly assertive in expressing its national views and interests in NATO and in Europe as a whole. For the purposes of the baseline analysis, this Note assumes that a united Germany remains firmly within the Western alliance, and it will attempt to assume a greater leadership role within Europe and the NATO alliance. Germany will seek the complete withdrawal of all short-

³For more discussion of this in the case of Norway, see Lund, 1989, pp. 16-23.

range nuclear systems, but it will avoid complete denuclearization by maintaining an airborne nuclear role.

The United Kingdom has played an important role in Danish and Norwegian security policy. It maintains an important commitment to send air and ground reinforcements to these two countries. The naval and air units based in the United Kingdom would also strongly contribute to defense of the Northern region. The Commander of NATO Northern Region Command is British. Norway and the United Kingdom have their own special relationship dating back to the British Expeditionary Force in Norway in 1940 and the wartime government in exile; the ties between Denmark and the United Kingdom are decidedly weaker. For these reasons, Britain has earned some say in Norwegian and Danish security affairs. In the baseline case, it is assumed that British elections in late 1991 or early 1992 will return Margaret Thatcher or another Tory and that Britain will maintain its current commitment to the region. Britain is assumed to resist moves toward rapid disarmament and substantial changes in existing security arrangements in the next five years.

The remaining NATO nations do not greatly affect either Denmark or Norway, at least individually. Until 1987, Canada maintained a commitment to reinforce North Norway with a brigade of troops; in June of that year, Canada withdrew that commitment and subsequently has lost any real influence on Norwegian policy. The Netherlands and Belgium occasionally consult with Denmark and Norway as the "smaller NATO nation," but the only important effect has been the decision to jointly build and procure the F-16. Otherwise, coordination between these nations has a minor effect. Neither Denmark nor Norway is strongly affected by the policies of France or the nations of the Southern Region, and this will almost certainly continue to be true.

This analysis assumes that the governments in place in 1989 are essentially retained throughout this period. This means that policies are largely dominated by center and right-of-center coalitions. If the next five years witness a resurgence of leftist governments elsewhere in Western Europe, especially in Germany, then leftist tendencies in Nordic Europe will probably be strengthened.

Overall, it is assumed that current trends will give NATO a more European flavor. The European members of NATO will explore ways of pursuing "European" solutions to common problems and to gradually reduce reliance on (and thus the influence of) the United States. This will be a slow evolution, with no substantial damage to relations. However, all major actors will seek to maintain some American presence in and commitment to Western Europe.

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

The European Community (EC) will move forward toward economic unification, but at a substantially slower pace than many Europeans now hope, as Western Europe tries to adjust to the changes in Eastern Europe. Denmark continues the process of integrating its economy more fully with the other EC members, while Norway remains outside the EC. In fact, no extension of EC membership is expected in the next five years. Sometime during the early 1990s, Western Europe is assumed to experience an economic recession, resulting in even greater pressures than at present to reduce defense budgets.

III. DANISH SECURITY POLICY: THE NEXT FIVE YEARS

GENERAL POLITICAL CONDITIONS

Danish politics have been marked by considerable electoral instability. This trend is likely to continue. With proportional representation and a multiparty system, no single party has been able to win a majority in the parliament (Folketing) in recent decades. Furthermore, the consensus on security and other policy areas has been eroding continuously since World War II. The differences in the platforms of the various parties are so great that no government has been able to form a majority coalition since the early 1970s. Thus, Denmark has been ruled by a succession of minority coalition governments with a new government typically forming every two to three years.

The Danish political universe consists of several standard alliances of parties. On the left, the *Social Democratic Party* (SDP), the *Socialist People's Party* (SPP), and several smaller parties often vote as a bloc, called in Denmark the "socialist" parties, against the center and right, or "nonsocialist" parties. The SDP ruled Denmark throughout much of the postwar period and it remains the nation's largest party. Its platform resembles that of other European SDPs, with a particularly strong emphasis on Nordic cooperation and, recently, on anti-nuclear and "defensive defense" policies. The SPP, formerly a Communist party, advocates left-wing socialism; it is strongly anti-NATO and anti-EEC, favoring unilateral disarmament and nonalignment. The *Left Socialist Party* is a Marxist-Leninist party. It lost its parliamentary representation in 1987, largely because of internal factionalism. *Common Cause* is an extreme left party. It won four seats in 1987 but lost them again in 1988. The Danish Communist Party has never garnered enough votes to win representation in the Folketing, and *glasnost* and *perestroika* have led to growing internal strains in the party.

The SDP and SPP form the real socialist alternative, with the several small parties on the far left having almost no influence. Yet after the 1988 elections, when the SDP proved unable to win support for any coalition that included the SPP, the SDP moved more toward the center and the SPP has become increasingly isolated and ineffective in the Folketing. Figure 1 shows the composition of the Folketing in 1987, and Fig. 2 in 1988.

On the extreme right, the *Progress Party* advocates a libertarian philosophy, at times pursuing its opposition to centralized government by voting against whatever majority is formed on a particular issue. However, the Progress Party has generally supported nonsocialist over socialist coalitions when it comes to forming governments. It advocates




Fig. 1 — The Danish Parliament, 1987




Fig. 2 — The Danish Parliament, 1988

abolition of the military and the diplomatic service. Its anti-immigration platform has led to charges that it is racist. Recently, Danish press reports have suggested that some members of the Progress Party are moving toward accommodation with the mainstream nonsocialist parties. Ironically this move, while temporarily increasing its influence in the Folketing, may undermine the party's long-term appeal with the disaffected portions of the electorate who expect the party to be anti-establishment.

The conservative parties consist of the *Conservative People's Party* and the *Liberal Party*. Both parties support strong defense and NATO's nuclear policy (or at least oppose active anti-nuclear policies), as well as Danish membership in the EEC. The Conservatives constitute the second largest party, but not by a large margin. In 1982, the Conservatives were able to form a government for the first time since 1929. At that point it had been in opposition for a decade. Before 1982, the Liberals had been the leaders of the center/right coalition, but their support has gradually eroded. Two more parties tend to be centrist or slightly right of center: the *Center Democrats* and the *Christian People's Party*. Both parties generally support NATO and an adequate defense. Together, these four parties form the core of nonsocialist power in the Folketing. Although they refuse to ally themselves with the Progress Party, they must have its support if they hope to win a nonsocialist majority.

For the last several years, the balance of power in the Folketing has been held by the Radical Liberals or "Radicals." Its platform advocates a moderate-to-conservative economic policy, emphasizing the role of the individual and small enterprise in society; in foreign affairs it advocates pacifism. Until the late 1970s, the Radicals supported SDP governments, but increasing dissatisfaction with the leftist policies of the socialist coalitions has led them to switch their support to the conservative nonsocialist parties. However, the Radicals refuse to support a government reliant upon a coalition with the extremist Progress Party; so after the 1985 election they withdrew their support for either left or right coalitions. Only in 1988 did they enter into a coalition government with the Conservatives and Liberals, once they were assured that the Progress Party would have no influence on government policies. Despite the Radicals' support for the Conservative-led majority on domestic and economic policy, their pacifist beliefs allow a nongovernmental majority that is essentially anti-defense and anti-nuclear to form on several security issues. The Christian People's Party and the Center Democrats have refused to join in a coalition with the Radicals, arguing that they are too leftist.¹

¹For more information on the role of the Radicals in the making of Danish defense policy, see Bjøl, 1986.

Led by the Social Democrats and with Radical support, the socialist parties were able to win a series of 23 security policy votes from 1984 to 1988 against the Conservative-led government. These votes included the withholding of Denmark's contribution to NATO's infrastructure funding of the ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) and Pershing II (1984) and opposing Danish participation in Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research (1985). Conservative Prime Minister Paul Schluter was willing to accept these losses because of the high priority his government placed on economic policy. Schluter made clear in NATO forums that his government did not control Danish defense policy.

The turning point came in April 1988 when the SDP passed a resolution requiring the government to "remind" visiting warships of Denmark's ban on nuclear weapons. Schluter decided to make this vote a "vital element" of his government's policy (equivalent to a vote of confidence), arguing that the resolution placed at risk Denmark's full membership in NATO.² When the government lost the vote, Schluter called a general election.

The results of the 1988 election were inconclusive, with both the socialist and nonsocialist alignments losing seats and the right-wing Progress Party gaining seven seats. After several weeks of negotiations, Paul Schluter formed a new minority government of Conservatives, Liberals, and Radical Liberals, with the support of the Center Democrats and Christian People's Party, and implicitly the Progress Party. This coalition is considered unstable and new elections could be called at any time. The coalition is held together less by any sense of conviction than by lack of a good alternative. One apparent effect of the election so far has been to halt the series of alternative security policy resolutions passed by the leftist parties.

SPECIFIC ISSUE AREAS

Conventional and Nuclear Arms Control Negotiations

Denmark is not a major player in arms control negotiations, for either conventional or nuclear forces. However, the de facto security policy majority in the Folketing (the socialists plus Radical Liberals) has managed to voice its dissensions to aspects of NATO's arms control policies. For example, within NATO forums, they forced the government to oppose NATO's dual track decision on INF, both by inserting official footnotes to NATO documents and by withholding infrastructure funding. This security policy majority believes that Denmark should go further toward actively encouraging new arms control agreements in Europe.

²Archer, 1988; Fouquet, 1988. Schluter cited British statements to the effect that Britain could no longer maintain its commitment to reinforce Denmark if the resolution passed.

A hardy perennial of Scandinavian politics is the Nordic Nuclear Free Zone (NNFZ).³ Stated simply, an NNFZ would seek to formalize the nonnuclear status of the Nordic states and ban nuclear weapons from the Nordic area, usually defined as the territories of Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland. The Conservative-led Danish government has been opposed to the proposal because, barring a major change in NATO policy, an NNFZ would be incompatible with Denmark's membership in the alliance and could weaken deterrence. However, the SDP has been able to pass several initiatives forcing the government to work for the establishment of an NNFZ. A committee of civil servants has been formed to study the issue, and new parliamentary initiatives are occasionally offered. Gorbachev raised the issue of an NNFZ in his speech to the Finnish parliament in October 1989, and pressure from Finland and Sweden could build again. If the left can win a majority in a new election, the NNFZ would certainly be considered more seriously in Copenhagen. The fate of the NNFZ in Denmark rests largely with the Social Democrats. The SPP and the Radical Liberals would support the idea unconditionally. The Social Democrats have so far insisted that any zone be approved by NATO. If they change their stance then the NNFZ would have a majority in the Folketing.

Quantitative and Qualitative Changes in Conventional Forces

The Danish military is widely regarded within NATO as inadequate to fulfill its obligations to the alliance. As a result, NATO ministers recently chastised Denmark for its military weakness and low defense spending, as have both Lord Carrington and General Rogers, and the British have threatened to withdraw their commitment to reinforce Denmark. With current political attitudes, no major improvement in conventional forces could be expected in Denmark in the next decade. A conventional arms control treaty would further undermine support for defense spending. In March 1989, the government passed a new three-year defense bill with the support of the SDP and the Christian People's Party. The bill calls for no real growth in defense spending during this period. The new bill authorizes a slight increase in the number of conscripts called up (by 2000 per year), paid for by reducing the pay of all conscripts.⁴ Several military facilities will be closed to increase efficiency. The Danish military will probably continue a slow decline in its already modest capability.

The principle that guides Danish defense planning and procurement is the anti-invasion concept. With a small population and a geographically exposed position, Denmark

³For more on the NNFZ, see Bitzinger, 1988.

⁴Although this was an issue in Denmark, Danish conscripts remain the best paid in NATO.

believes that the best use of its resources would be in defeating a Warsaw Pact invasion of Denmark. This concept is not new. However, in recent years some Danes have reinterpreted it in light of defensive defense. Whereas the military (including NATO) argues that anti-invasion defense works best by attacking invasion forces before they come close to Danish shores, many politicians now prefer a force structure that permits defense only in or very near Danish territory. This preference has begun to affect the structure and capabilities of the Danish military.

The Danish Air Force is the healthiest of the services and forms the core of Danish defense. It recently completed a major modernization program with the acquisition of the F-16, which consumed most of the national military acquisition budget of the 1980s and left little for the army and navy. By the mid-1990s, the *Drakens* will be eliminated, partly under CFE reductions. The Danish Air Force hopes to procure some additional aircraft to replace one of the two squadrons of aging F-35 *Drakens* in the late 1990s. However, even these plans may be dropped or substantially scaled down as a result of CFE and Soviet troop withdrawals. In any event, the Danish Air Force has been seriously constrained by a massive pilot shortage, which effectively grounds many of its planes. In addition, the capabilities of this very modern fleet of F-16s has been limited by the decision to restrict the air force to more "defensive" missions such as air defense and attacks on amphibious assaults. Even before the fall of the Berlin Wall, the air force had not been able to procure munitions that could be used to strike targets in Warsaw Pact territory (such as airbases or columns of vehicles). Now, those missions will probably be dropped completely, especially given the short combat radius of the Danish F-16s.

The Danish army and navy have fared much worse in recent years. Their equipment is terribly outdated, much of it from the late 1950s and early 1960s. Under the new defense bill, the army will replace its 110 old British Centurion tanks with used German Leopard I tanks, while the very old M-48 tanks will be modernized. The navy will lose two frigates, the last of its major surface combat ships, and two of its submarines will be modernized. The frigates will be replaced by shore-based anti-shipping missile batteries, advancing the concept of a more "defensive defense."⁵ The navy will also get some new coastal patrol boats.

⁵Hans Haekkerup, the SDP defense negotiator, referred to this as an important change in Danish defense "in a more defensive direction." The Conservative negotiator, Connie Hedegaard, dismissed this interpretation as "really inconceivable nonsense." Despite the Conservatives' objections, replacing all major surface combatants with shore-based missiles was a major element of the defensive defense proposals and therefore can be seen as a victory for its advocates.

The condition of the Danish military could deteriorate further if the socialist parties gain greater support in a new election, assuming they do not revise their electoral platforms. The SDP has been toying with the idea of adopting a much stricter form of "defensive defense," having proposed to eliminate all submarines and major surface combatants from the navy, restricting the air force to home air defense, and eliminating what little armor the army possesses. The 1989 defense agreement takes several major steps in this direction. The SPP and Progress Party would prefer to eliminate the military entirely. Although such an extreme outcome is unlikely, a greatly reduced military posture is quite possible, especially under a CFE regime. An intermediate and quite feasible approach would be to retire aging weapon systems (*Draken* aircraft, submarines, M-48 tanks) without replacement, probably under the guise of CFE.

Theater-Based Nuclear Deterrence

Like Norway, Denmark prohibits nuclear weapons on its soil in peacetime and would probably continue the ban in wartime. This policy was enunciated in 1959 when NATO first began its debate on theater nuclear forces. In recent years, some Danish political parties have become increasingly vocal in their opposition to NATO's nuclear policies. In May 1984, the SDP was able to force legislation stopping the Danish contribution to NATO's infrastructure funding for GLCM deployments. The far left parties want Denmark to quit membership in NATO's Nuclear Planning Group, but the SDP and the nonsocialist parties prefer continued membership, but for different reasons. However, both the government and the socialists support Germany's opposition to modernization of theater nuclear forces until after 1992 and its call for immediate negotiations for the reductions of these weapons.

Danish concerns about nuclear weapons center on allied ships in Danish ports. The INF treaty has focused more attention on the issue because SLCMs on American ships could be seen as a "compensation" for systems removed under the treaty. Within Denmark, this possibility has drawn attention to the question of port calls by American ships. The issue came to a head in 1988. On April 14, the Social Democrats, after considerable internal conflict, managed to win support for a measure requiring that all visiting warships be "reminded" of Denmark's three-decade-old ban on nuclear weapons. The Conservative-led government of Paul Schluter decided to declare this matter a "vital element" of its security policy, resulting in a general election. The inconclusive election results meant that the issue remained unresolved. After some additional posturing,⁶ the parties reached a compromise

⁶One example of this post-election action came in late June 1988, when an American destroyer visited the Danish port of Aalborg. The government failed to send a letter to the captain reminding him

whereby allied ships were assumed to adhere to Denmark's policy, essentially the same state as before. In the aftermath of these inconclusive results, the major parties in Denmark will probably avoid calling another election on nuclear issues.

Economic Issues

Denmark is often criticized for its low level of defense spending. It has never come close to reaching the NATO goal of 3 percent real growth in defense spending, despite its wealth and the low base from which it started. With Denmark's high personnel costs (almost 60 percent of the defense budget), very little money is left for weapon acquisitions. Given that the parties have agreed to no real growth in defense spending over the next four years, burdensharing will undoubtedly continue to be a point of contention between Denmark and its allies. Criticism comes not only from the United States, but also from the United Kingdom (with its commitment to reinforce Denmark) and Germany (which shares responsibility for defense of the Baltic Approaches). However, such pressure tactics merely reinforce the position of the more isolationist parties who tap into the Danish aversion to outside interference.⁷

Beyond these burdensharing issues, no real relationship exists between foreign trade and security issues. Denmark has no major defense industry, and popular opinion does not provide much support for the little there is. Denmark must import virtually all of its major weapons.

The biggest economic question over the next few years—perhaps the biggest political question as well—will be how to adjust to the establishment of a unified internal market in the European Community at the end of 1992. The adjustments required will be considerable. The Danish tax burden is the highest in the EC, as is the per capita debt. Denmark will have the largest downward adjustment in value-added tax in all of the EC, resulting in a loss of revenues equal to 5 percent of Danish GNP. Adjustments will not be politically easy, because Denmark has the highest proportion of public opposition to membership of all the EC countries.

of Denmark's ban on nuclear weapons, and the leaders of the SDP, SPP, and Communist Party attempted to deliver the message themselves. They were unsuccessful, and other parties accused the group of attempting to pursue an independent foreign policy.

⁷This aversion to external pressure became evident in the 1988 election, when the socialist parties chose to campaign against the government's pro-NATO platform under the slogan "Denmark decides itself."

Structure of NATO

The Nordic members of NATO—Norway, Denmark, and Iceland—have sought to maintain a separate identity and sense of membership within the alliance. They imposed certain limiting conditions on their membership, such as a ban on nuclear weapon or foreign bases on their territory. Beyond their commitment to this Nordic identity within NATO, the Danes have been quiet concerning possible shifting responsibilities within the alliance.⁸ However, some speculative thoughts could be offered. The pro-defense parties would probably be reluctant to see a weakening of the U.S. role in NATO or the creation of Franco-German pillar. Such actions could result in a lessened commitment to the Atlanticist view and its emphasis on the Northern Flank, leading to a reduced commitment by the principal Atlantic powers—the United States and the United Kingdom—to reinforce Denmark. The left-wing parties would favor a reduced role for the United States within Europe, especially if it meant decreased reliance on nuclear weapons. However, they would not advocate increased ties to a “continental” pillar; instead, they would push for even greater emphasis on reductions in tensions and increased security discussions with the Nordic nations.

SOME VARIATIONS ON THE LIKELY CASE

Plausible Electoral Variations

Two important characteristics of contemporary Danish politics are (1) the multifaceted coalitions that form in the Folketing and (2) frequent elections. Almost all governments are formed on domestic issues, usually economic and social policies. Since 1981, the government has rarely enjoyed a majority on security policy, while the SDP has been able to pass a series of its own bills. In the future, neither the pro-defense nor the anti-defense alignments are likely to have a majority, with the Progress Party (and perhaps other parties) voting against both sides. In such an event, security policy could reach an indefinite impasse. Such a condition virtually exists today. After the experience of 1988, no government is likely to call another election over security policy. However, elections will probably be required at some point in the next year or two given the basic instability of the current Folketing. The most plausible electoral possibilities, in decreasing order of probability, would be:

- *Roughly like current conditions, with no coalition having a firm majority on any issue.* This seems by far the most likely outcome. No changes are made in Danish security policy. The military continues to slowly deteriorate because of a

⁸The low level of Danish defense spending and the resulting criticisms from the NATO allies has greatly weakened Denmark's voice in NATO forums.

freeze on defense spending. No consensus can be formed on security policy, and decisions on defense spending and weapons procurement are avoided.

- *Resurgent Right/Center coalition in new elections.* The Conservatives are able to form a new center-right coalition without the Radical Liberals. Modest real growth is realized in defense spending. The military services modernize the forces left after CFE, with the air force upgrading its F-16s and the army acquiring new tanks. Denmark remains mute on nuclear issues within NATO.
- *Reestablishment of a centrist security consensus.* The 1989 defense agreement proves to be a watershed in Danish security policy. The SDP moves back toward the center on security policy, while the traditionally pro-defense parties compromise on certain aspects of defense policy. All parties agree that Denmark should maintain the force structure established in the 1989 agreement unless modified by a CFE agreement, and they agree to modernize forces as needed. Training and readiness are improved. Certain "offensive" missions are prohibited (a blue-water navy and rear-area attacks by the air force), but all remaining missions are adequately funded. This consensus remains even if governments change on other issues.
- *Resurgent Left/Pacifist coalition in new elections.* The SDP moves to the left and reconciles its differences Socialist People's Party. The SDP with the support of the SPP, and perhaps the Radical Liberals, forms a majority government after new elections. The new government is committed to enforcing Denmark's ban on nuclear weapon and to establishing a thoroughly "defensive defense." Visiting warships are monitored for nuclear weapons. The remnants of the blue-water navy are eliminated, plans to replace the Draken fighter are cancelled, and the F-16 is limited to an air defense role. Within NATO, the Danish government opposes nuclear modernization and pushes for greater progress in the conventional arms control talks.

Soviet Policy

The baseline analysis assumed a continuation of Soviet policy roughly as it has proceeded in the last couple years, with a weakening of Soviet control in Eastern Europe and a gradual reduction in forces. In this environment, the Danish public finds less and less justification for increases in defense spending and accepting nuclear weapons in Europe. Two alternative Soviet attitudes could change these attitudes and the assessments above:

- *Near total withdrawal of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe.* If the Soviet Union eliminated its forces in Eastern Europe, support for defense spending in Denmark would probably collapse. The socialists and Radical Liberals would probably argue that NATO was the vestige of "old thinking" and that Denmark must take moral leadership in creating a new Europe. The result would be an accelerated dismantling of the Danish military and possibly its elimination.
- *Revival of Soviet Reactionism.* If the Soviet Union resumed an openly hostile attitude toward reform in Eastern Europe, Danish attitudes would change toward greater support for defense spending. This would be particularly true if a crisis involved the Baltic region, such as a Soviet submarine being captured in Sweden or the Soviets initiating a harsh crack-down on the Baltic Republics or Poland. The more pro-defense parties would argue that they were correct all along, that a leopard cannot change its spots, and that Denmark must not repeat the mistakes of the 1930s when Denmark unilaterally disarmed.

Traditionally, Danish attitudes have not been highly sensitive to modest changes in Soviet behavior. However, given the narrow balance between factions in the Folketing, even a small shift in public opinion could result in a change of governments and the formation of a new majority. In particular, a small shift toward the socialist parties would give them a majority.

Policies of Other NATO Members

Although on the whole Denmark is not greatly influenced by actions and comments of alliance nations (with the notable exception of Norway), some Danish parties are responsive to such actions. The SDP maintains close contact with its West German counterpart, the SPD, and often follows its lead on security policy matters. The formation of an SPD government in West Germany would influence the SDP in Denmark. A more widespread resurgence of socialist parties in the West would certainly help the SPD. The nonsocialist defense-oriented parties have been concerned about the growing negative image of Denmark within the alliance, however, and are sensitive to what the major alliance members say; in their minds, this partly justified calling elections after the Conservative government lost the vote concerning port calls.

Certain policy changes by allied nations could affect Danish policy. The baseline projection above assumed that allied country countries pursue policies roughly in line with current behavior. Some plausible alternative policies include:

- *Norway bans port calls by ships carrying nuclear weapons.* In this event, one would expect Denmark to follow suit. Similarly, if Norway should object to American naval deployments or strategies in the Norwegian Sea (for instance, deployment of vessels carrying nuclear-armed SLCMs), Denmark would undoubtedly support the Norwegian position.
- *Germany reunites and declares its neutrality.* This action would lead to a collapse of NATO as we now know it. Denmark would probably opt for neutrality or a alignment with its Nordic neighbors if possible.
- *Great Britain carries through on its threat to withdraw its commitment to reinforce Denmark.* Such an action could become a political issue in Denmark. The Socialist People's Party and Radical Liberals might use this as an argument to withdraw from NATO rather than succumb to pressure from outside powers. The nonsocialist parties would attempt to strengthen Danish defense and perhaps seek an offsetting commitment from the United States.
- *America substantially disengages from Europe.* Disengagement can come in the form of shifting emphasis away from Europe toward the Pacific or elsewhere, or in the form of decreasing troop strengths for budgetary or arms control reasons. The results could be similar to the above case. However, if the result were merely a "Europeanization" of NATO's defense, Denmark would probably remain within the alliance but without increasing its defense spending.

CONCLUSIONS

The most likely course for Danish security policy over the next few years is a slow decline in military capabilities, beyond treaty imposed reductions, and objection to modernization of NATO's nuclear forces. The current absence of a strong majority, either for or against improved defenses, will result in compromises that fail to do anything. On more symbolic questions involving arms control and nuclear weapons, the anti-nuclear majority in the Folketing will continue to pass resolutions making their objections clear. Otherwise, barring a major shift in representation in the Folketing, the next few years will be marked by inaction, or reaction to external events, in the security sphere.

IV. NORWEGIAN SECURITY POLICY: THE NEXT FIVE YEARS

GENERAL POLITICAL CONDITIONS

Norway has enjoyed considerably greater electoral stability than has Denmark. Like Denmark, Norway has a multiparty system, with the members of the parliament, the Storting, being elected by proportional representation. However, the Storting is not subject to dissolution; if the government loses a vote of confidence, the next largest party not in the current government will be asked to form a new one. Members of the Storting serve for a full four-year term. This single fact makes the Norwegian political environment far more stable than Denmark's since all parties realize that they must live with the makeup of the parliament for its full term. Changes of government in mid-term are rare, having occurred only four times since World War II (1963, 1971, 1972, and 1986), twice over the controversial proposal for Norway to join the EEC. Figures 3 and 4 show the composition of the Storting in the earlier and later 1980s.

The Socialist Parties

The *Labor Party* has dominated Norwegian political life for the last half century. Labor has led the government for 48 of the last 59 years and has held the largest number of seats in the Storting continually since 1927. After almost five years out of power in the early 1980s, Labor revived under the leadership of Gro Harlem Brundtland, who grew in confidence and political stature as she survived and governed better than most observers in Norway expected. From 1986 to 1989, Brundtland headed a minority Labor government with the *de facto* support of the Center and Christian People's parties in the center and the *Socialist Left Party* on the left. The party suffered a major setback in the 1989 elections when it lost eight of its 72 seats. It now sits in opposition.

Labor's policies resemble those of the other Scandinavian SPDs, although perhaps more centrist on defense issues. Labor has organized and nurtured Norway's security and foreign policy consensus in the postwar period. Although a minority within the party tends to be anti-NATO, the leadership and the majority of the membership remain firmly committed to the alliance. Moderate Laborites, including the leadership, tend to be Atlanticists, while the left wing tends to be more Nordic and somewhat anti-American. However, the moderate's pro-NATO stance does not translate into support for maintaining defense spending; the Labor government has reduced manpower levels and has slowed growth rates for military spending.




Fig. 3—The Norwegian Parliament, 1981-1985




Fig. 4—The Norwegian Parliament, 1985-1989

In foreign economic policy, the party leadership seems to be leaning toward seeking membership in the EEC, but a poll in early 1989 indicated that the Labor rank-and-file was split roughly 30-30-40 among those in favor, opposed, and undecided. Because of this internal division, the Labor leadership attempted to keep the question of membership in the EEC off the political agenda for the fall 1989 election.¹

The left in Norway holds a much weaker position than in other Scandinavian nations. The Socialist Left Party, a former coalition of far-left socialist and communist parties, maintains an anti-EEC, anti-NATO, and anti-nuclear platform. The party gained considerable support and influence during the late 1970s and early 1980s in the wake of the debates over the neutron bomb and deployment of Pershing II and GLCMs. When the centrist parties in the parliament began to support the Labor government in the mid-1980s, the influence of the SLP declined sharply. In response, the party slightly moderated its position on several issues. The Socialist Left was able to capitalize on dissatisfaction with Labor in 1989 election, and it increased its representation from six to 17 seats. In recent years, it has deemphasized its anti-NATO stance but has increased its opposition to anything involving nuclear weapons. The party would favor the establishment of an NNFZ. Several small communist parties have been unable to garner more than 0.2 percent of the vote and do not hold any seats in the Storting. By early 1990, opinion within the party had shifted toward a more pro-EEC position, which should make the leadership more willing to openly support Norwegian membership.

The Nonsocialist Parties

The nonsocialist opposition is led by the Conservative Party, the oldest party in Norway. The Conservatives favor a strong defense, including NATO's use of nuclear weapons if necessary, and overwhelmingly favor entry into the EEC. In the early 1980s, they enjoyed an upwelling of popular support, increasing their representation in 1981 from 44 to 53 seats and allowing them to form a minority government under Kare Willoch. For a time it appeared that the Conservatives would surpass Labor as the nation's largest party. However, their support has been diminishing. In 1985, they lost three seats and their coalition lost two seats overall. They managed to form a minority government with the support of the Progress Party, but the government was forced to resign in the following year when the Progress Party withdrew its support. In the 1989 election, the Conservative Party

¹Since the effects of "1992" promise to be a major issue in Norway, this section addresses partisan attitudes toward the EEC.

suffered a dramatic decline in support, losing 13 of its 50 seats. Even so, it was able to form another minority government with the support of the revived Progress party.

Three other parties—primarily rural—make up the mainstream nonsocialist alternative. The *Christian's People Party*, also known as the Christian Democratic Party, advocates conservative policies with particular emphasis on anti-abortion legislation and increased trade with developing countries. The party almost always votes with the Conservatives on domestic issues, but some members tend to be pacifist and anti-nuclear. The Christian Democrats currently hold 14 seats after losing two seats in the 1989 elections. The *Center Party*, formerly the Agrarian Party and still referred to as Agrarians, emphasizes ecological issues and shorter work weeks, generally adopting a moderate nonsocialist stance. It currently holds 11 seats, having lost one seat in 1989. After the collapse of the nonsocialist government in 1986, the Agrarians and the Conservatives were feuding; the Conservatives opposed increased subsidies to farmers, renewing the old urban/rural split in Norwegian politics. They managed to put aside their differences to form a new government, but the stability of the grouping is uncertain at best. The *Liberal Party* stresses ecological issues and philosophically liberal economic policies, two stances increasingly at odds. One of the oldest parties in Norway, it had gradually lost its votes to various splinter groups until it completely lost its representation in the Storting in 1985. All three parties overwhelmingly oppose membership in the EEC, with the Center Democrats being the most vocal opponents. Figure 5 shows the current Storting configuration.

The *Progress Party* is a right-wing group, formerly known as the "Anders Lange's Party for a Strong Reduction in Taxes, Rates, and Public Intervention." The Progress Party advocates a platform very similar to Jean-Marie LePen's National Front in France, offering simplistic solutions to the nation's problems and appealing to Norway's latent xenophobia. It favors a strong defense, but not necessarily closer ties to NATO.

Until the 1989 election, the Progress Party was the smallest in the Storting, having only two seats after the 1985 election;² however, those two seats held the balance of power. After the 1985 election, the socialist parties held 77 seats and the other nonsocialists 78 seats. At first the Progress Party supported a Conservative-led government, but in April 1986 it withdrew that support over a proposed gas tax increase, and a new Labor-led government was formed. Oddly enough, a socialist government was kept in power for three years with the support of an extreme anti-socialist party.

²At the local level, the Progress Party had done much better, where it had gotten the third largest number of votes nationwide.




Fig. 5—The Norwegian Parliament, 1989—

The Progress Party was by far the biggest winner in 1989, gaining 20 more seats for a total of 22, or 13 percent of the Storting. It can no longer be considered a small fringe group. In almost any scenario, it will have a major if not decisive say in who governs. The centrist parties may begin to chafe at the need to appease the Progress Party. The Conservatives will be torn between keeping their coalition partners happy and not losing the support of Progress. The Labor Party cannot hope to do much better, needing the support of the Socialist Left if it is ever to form a government, but also probably needing the centrist parties as well.

SPECIFIC ISSUE AREAS

Conventional and Nuclear Arms Control Negotiations

Norway has maintained a low profile on arms control matters, taking a back seat to the major NATO members, except when it involves the Nordic region. Former Defense Minister Johan Jorgen Holst has been very effective in convincing a majority of Norwegian policymakers of the need to balance reassurance (that Norway will not allow its territory to be used for aggression against Soviet interests) and deterrence (of Soviet attacks). Many Norwegian statements and documents included Holst-inspired rhetoric even before he

became Defense Minister.³ Norway will generally support nuclear arms control, either strategic or theater, as long as it maintains this balancing act. Norway would object to any arms control agreement that made the Kola Peninsula⁴ or Norwegian Sea an area of increased military activity or importance, such as if ICBMs were eliminated and greater emphasis was placed on SLBMs and SLCMs. In conventional arms reduction talks, Norway will emphasize the need to include Soviet forces on the Kola Peninsula and in the Leningrad Military District. In particular, Norway will want assurances that forces withdrawn from Central Europe will not simply be redeployed into the Soviet Union. Norway could go so far as to hold up an agreement until it received such assurances. Norway would probably support agreements reducing the potential for superpower confrontations in the Norwegian Sea provided that such agreements did not greatly hinder NATO's ability to reinforce Norway in crisis.

The NNFZ has been a recurrent idea in Nordic affairs. The Norwegian government has shown only lukewarm interest in the proposal because, barring a major change in NATO policy, an NNFZ would be incompatible with Norway's membership in the alliance and could weaken deterrence. However, the concept was reintroduced into the political debate by a Labor politician and former ambassador, and the idea has won support among leftist groups in Labor and forms part of the platform of the Socialist Left Party. The Labor party has made "consideration" of an NNFZ part of their platform, but the leadership has attempted to mute interest in the concept, which has fallen off in the late 1980s but could be revived by Gorbachev's speech to the Finnish parliament in October 1989. If a Labor-Left Socialist government is formed, the NNFZ could once again climb to the top of the national agenda.

Quantitative and Qualitative Changes in Conventional Forces

No major changes in conventional forces can be expected in Norway during the next several years. In terms of equipment, the Norwegian military should be in moderately good condition if all currently planned programs go through. The Norwegian Air Force recently completed a major modernization program with the acquisition of the F-16, which consumed most of the national military acquisition budget of the 1980s. The air force will receive the

³See Norway, Royal Ministry of Defense, 1983. Although this document was written under a Conservative-led government, many of the concepts and phrases describing Norwegian policy reflect Holst's worldview. Of course, many Norwegians hold a more traditional view of the Soviet threat, but the dominant viewpoint has tended to come closer to Holst's formulation. For some discussion of the views of Holst contrasted with the Conservatives, see Lund, 1989, pp. 24-25.

⁴The Kola Peninsula of the Soviet Union is home base for two-thirds of the Soviet ballistic missile submarine fleet and would form the first line of air defense against American bombers and cruise missiles launched toward the European Soviet heartland.

Penguin Mk III anti-shipping missile, which is essential for the F-16's mission of interdiction of amphibious assaults. The Norwegian Army is currently undergoing a modest modernization program consisting of the acquisition of more anti-tank missiles, oversnow vehicles, and some older tanks and armored personnel carriers from the United States. The Norwegian navy is retiring a few submarines and modernizing the remainder.

Manpower remains the biggest problem for the Norwegian military. In Norway, labor laws apply to the military, ensuring a minimum wage, limiting soldiers to a 38 hour work week, providing time-and-a-half for overtime, and so on. This helps raise manpower costs to 60 percent of the defense budget. Despite real growth rates of 3 percent in defense spending, the military has had to eliminate hundreds of positions; FY1990's budget alone calls for a reduction of 450 positions out of a total strength of 35,000. More seriously, the military has been forced to reduce the refresher training by a third for its reserves. With a population base of only 4 million, Norway must rely heavily on mobilization for its defense. In the event of war, the army would mushroom from 19,000 to 100,000 in less than a week. Thus, any reduction in the readiness of reserves gravely diminishes Norwegian capabilities.⁵ But not only the mobilization forces are affected: The air force has been unable to retain enough pilots for all its planes. For the last several years it could maintain only some 50 pilots for its 67 F-16s. Similar problems exist for technicians in all the services.

From 1986 to 1989, the Labor government attempted to limit the growth of defense expenditures by reducing manpower and increasing "efficiency," the dominant buzz-word in the defense debate. The Labor government was not able to secure a majority for its proposals, with a centrist-right bloc winning more money for defense. The new government should be able to maintain fairly healthy levels of defense spending. The Progress Party, contrary to its general libertarian line, favors more spending on defense. This can be explained by their interest in reducing reliance on outside powers (i.e. NATO) to defend Norway, and in part by their feeling that the money can come from reduced expenditures in the social sector.

Norway has been able to maintain real growth in defense spending largely because of the government revenues from oil production, which allowed a substantial modernization program in the 1980s, given the small population of Norway. If the price of oil should fall or if an accident should cripple Norwegian drilling platforms, Norwegian government revenues

⁵To make matters worse, the most critical region militarily, Finnmark (which borders the Soviet Union), has been experiencing massive depopulation, almost entirely among the youngest cohorts. This evaporation of the mobilization base may eventually force Norway to increase the size of the standing army.

would be hurt substantially and the military modernization programs would probably be reduced.

Theater-Based Nuclear Deterrence

Norway prohibits nuclear weapons on its soil in peacetime and would probably continue the ban at least in the early stages of any conflict. Norway explicitly reserves the right to permit the deployment of nuclear weapons of its soil whenever it sees fit. This policy was first enunciated in 1959 and has been periodically reaffirmed or strengthened over the years. Most recently, in 1986 the Norwegian government refused to allow a U.S. F-111 to refuel in Norway because the aircraft was nuclear-capable. Despite these occasional disagreements, Norwegian governments of both the left and right have continued to support NATO's nuclear strategy.⁶ At the same time, the Norwegian government has not been supporting the proposal to modernize NATO's short-range nuclear weapons.

The main Norwegian concern involving nuclear weapon centers on allied ships, particularly SLCMs on American vessels operating in and around Norwegian territory. The leftist parties and some elements of the Labor Party would like to ban port calls by ships carrying nuclear weapons. Currently, the Norwegian government merely informs all governments of its ban on nuclear weapons, and it "expects" everyone to abide by its policy. The INF treaty has renewed interest in the question of port calls, because the use of SLCMs on American ships could be used as a "compensation" for systems removed under the treaty. So far the Labor Party has been able to keep the issue off the party platform, although some local party chapters (including Oslo and Bergen) have called for a more active ban.

Although the Labor Party has not wanted to make port calls an issue, it has been concerned with the possibility that deployments of SLCMs in the Norwegian Sea would increase tensions in the area. While serving as Minister of Defense, Johan Holst urged NATO and the United States to proceed cautiously and to avoid a "Mediterraneanization" of the Norwegian Sea, where large numbers of American and Soviet vessels would be in constant proximity to each other. At the same time, Holst reaffirmed Norway's commitment to a regular but moderate-sized American presence in the Norwegian Sea.

Economic Issues

In security policy, the most troubling economic issue for Norway in recent years has been the Toshiba-Kongsberg scandal. In the winter of 1986-87, the U.S. government presented evidence to the Norwegian government that the Kongsberg Weapon Factory—

⁶However, if an NNFZ were to be declared, Norway and NATO would face a major crisis.

state-owned and heavily subsidized—along with Toshiba in Japan had been exporting highly sophisticated computers and cutting equipment to the Soviet Union, allowing the Soviets to build far quieter submarines. The estimated damage in terms of additional antisubmarine warfare capability needed was measured in the billions of dollars. This scandal led to efforts in the U.S. Congress to ban imports of weapons built by Kongsberg. Such a ban would have crippled the Norwegian arms industry; Kongsberg relies on sales to the U.S. military, especially for the Penguin missile, which is the primary anti-ship missile of both the navy and air force. Norwegian officials have worked hard to thwart a ban, with success. Yet the government faced a dilemma: if it wishes to avoid a ban, it must show—to the satisfaction of the U.S. Congress—that measures have been taken to punish the individuals responsible, but if it wishes to maintain support at home, it cannot appear to be caving in to American pressures. Although now largely in the past, the Kongsberg affair remains an example of the sort of nasty problem that can arise in Norwegian-American relations.

A major question for Norway in the next five years will be how to respond to the creation of a unified market in the EC at the end of 1992. Norwegians have been reluctant to reopen the issue of membership in the EC, remembering how divisive the question of membership was in the early 1970s. However, the enormous changes occurring in Europe have opened the real possibility that Norway will apply for membership after 1993. If Norway fails to enter the EC, it may find itself being pushed toward closer ties with either the United States and Canada or with the neutral states of Sweden and Finland. Either possibility holds problems for Norway's concept of itself and its security.

Structure of NATO

Within NATO, Norwegian officials have emphasized two aspects of Norwegian identity: the *Nordic* and the *Atlantic*. From the beginning of the alliance, Norway has stressed the special nature of the Nordic members of NATO: itself, Denmark, and Iceland. These states have maintained a separate identity and sense of membership within the alliance, and they have imposed well-known limitations on their membership. The Norwegians in particular stressed the importance of the so-called "Nordic Balance": the pattern of security relationships in the far north involving Norway, Denmark, and Iceland on one side, the Soviet Union on the other, and neutrals Sweden and Finland in the center. The need to operate within the conditions of this relationship fundamentally shaped Norwegian security policy.

At the same time, Norway has always emphasized that it is an Atlantic nation. Before World War II, Norwegian security relied on the implicit guarantee of Britain—the primary

Atlantic naval power—to protect the freedom of the seas and Norwegian independence. From the beginning, Norway has emphasized NATO's Atlantic nature. Norway's closest allies have been the North Atlantic powers: the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. Even the Netherlands, with its sizable navy, holds an important place in Norwegian security. Traditionally, Norway remained somewhat aloof from continental affairs. Norway had no historical ties to France and it kept Germany at a distance. Norwegian defense has been oriented northward toward Finnmark rather than southward toward Denmark, Germany, and the Baltic Sea.

However, Norwegian policy elites are changing their attitudes toward the isolation from the European continent and about their preferred distribution of responsibilities within NATO. During 1988, Norwegian policymakers began to speak increasingly of the "European" aspects of Norwegian policy. Papers are being issued by the various ministries on the role of Norway in Europe. The Storting has been debating the effect of 1992 and has been toying with the idea of holding a new referendum on membership in the EC. The Defense Ministry is considering Norwegian defenses of South Norway and the Baltic, and it is increasing security discussions with Germany.⁷ Norwegian officials speak of their need to understand the European context of the security debate between East and West.

One cannot predict where this debate will end; the Norwegians themselves do not know. At a minimum, Norway will probably move toward greater economic and security cooperation with the continental West European nations and will place less emphasis on relations with the United States and the United Kingdom. German-Norwegian relations will become more important in both the economic and the military spheres. The outcome of the EC question could strongly influence these tendencies one way or the other.

Abstract and Symbolic Issues

Norwegian officials are very concerned that NATO understand its view of the world. Since the 1960s, Norwegian officials used the concept of the Nordic Balance to explain this view. This term was used to explain a perceived pattern of relationships in Nordic Europe whereby (stated very simply):

⁷The shift in focus can already be seen in one area: In 1987 Canada withdrew its commitment to provide reinforcements to Norway, and Germany is assuming part of that responsibility; Germany will commit an artillery battalion to Norway. Norwegian officials also reportedly had spoken to France about committing reinforcements, but France showed no interest.

1. Restraint by Nordic NATO states in peacetime results in lower tensions in the region, allows Finland to maintain its independence from Moscow, and reduces the risk of war;
2. The implicit *threat* that Norway would permit U.S. bases and even nuclear weapons in Norway restrains the Soviet Union in crisis.

Norwegians, even high-level officials, refer to themselves and the other Nordic peoples as being caught by the accident of geography between the two superpowers. Although Norwegians feel much stronger affinity to the West than to the East, many still view NATO as more a marriage of convenience than of passion.⁸

Recently, the term Nordic Balance has fallen into disfavor, since the word "balance" was misleading. Instead, Norwegians now speak of the Nordic area as a "region of low tensions" and describe Norwegian security policy as a combination of *deterrence* of the Soviet Union through conventional defense and rapid reinforcement and *reassurance* of the Soviet Union—and indirectly Sweden and Finland—that Norwegian territory will not be used for aggression against Soviet interests. This requires maintaining a fine balance between protecting Norwegian sovereignty and avoiding actions that might provoke the Soviet Union. Norway will continue to stress the importance of its "Base Policy"—the prohibition against foreign bases in Norway—in its relations with both the United States and the Soviet Union. It will insist on freedom of the seas in the water around Norway, but will also strive to limit the "Mediterraneanization" of the Norwegian Sea and to avoid U.S.-USSR confrontations in both the Norwegian and Barents Seas. At the same time it will seek to have the widest possible commitment from NATO to reinforce NATO in crisis and war.

Another important symbol in Norwegian security policy is "flags," which is shorthand for a nation, specifically a NATO ally. The Norwegian political goal for allied reinforcements is to have as many flags involved as possible. Similarly in the Norwegian Sea, the Norwegian government has been speaking increasingly of the need to get more allied flags in NATO patrols and to rely less on American ships. The point is to let the Soviet Union know that an attack on Norway is an attack on NATO, while limiting the potential for superpower clashes in the region. When Canada withdrew its commitment to reinforce Norway, the Norwegians viewed the action as a major blow, less for the loss of military capability (which was marginal at best) but for the loss of an important symbol. Similarly, Norwegian officials were rather uninterested in American or British forces as compensation, since both countries

⁸For a detailed discussion of Norwegian security attitudes, see Lund, 1989.

were already adequately represented and additional American forces could be counterproductive.

SOME VARIATIONS ON THE LIKELY CASE

Plausible Electoral Variations

The 1989 elections had greatly bounded plausible alternative future governments. The current Storting will sit until September 1993, and this Note will not attempt to forecast electoral outcomes at that point.

The most likely course over the next few years would be for the Conservatives to rule for two to three years with Progress Party support, then fall to a Labor-Socialist Left government. Since all parties realize that they must live with each other until 1993, they will be reluctant to rock the boat excessively. The Conservative government will avoid controversial positions in an effort to keep its coalition in power. However, at some point this balancing act will fail and Labor will be asked to form a government. This scenario avoids difficult decisions on various issues, and the government will be willing to tolerate losses on some votes rather than give up control. A situation on defense issues similar to that in Denmark from 1984 to 1988 could emerge in Norway.

A nasty alternative future would arise if the Progress Party fails to offer stable support to any coalition. Under this scenario, governmental control and coalitions will change several times over the next four years, with potentially wild shifts in policy (at least by Norwegian standards). Security policy could become unpredictable.

Another possibility would be for the eventual formation of a Labor-Center-Christian Democrat majority coalition, which seems unlikely in 1990; but if several years of relying on the Progress Party becomes intolerable, the centrist parties might prefer alignment with Labor than either a Labor-Socialist Left coalition or continuation of the current government.

Policies of the United States and the Soviet Union

Norwegian security policy remains very sensitive to both American and Soviet security policy, both as it relates specifically to Europe and according to the overall Soviet-American strategic balance. Many changes in superpower policies could affect the projections made here. Since so many of the possible changes in American and Soviet policies are related, the two are treated together.

- *Increased assertiveness of U.S. naval strategy in the far north.* Norway has been very cautious and concerned about the more forward maritime strategy pursued

by the U.S. Navy since the early 1980s. Norwegian officials believe they can live with the current level of activity, although with some reservations, particularly concerning possible wartime plans to attack Soviet SSBNs during conventional operations. However, any further increase could result in a public and elite backlash against American policies and an effort to distance Norway from American actions. A more assertive American posture could come in the form of a more isolationist approach (à la "Discriminate Deterrence"), or increased deployments of SLCM-armed vessels, or increased deployments of carrier task forces.

- *Substantially reduced American military commitment to Europe.* Any reduction in the American commitment of forces to Europe, whether driven by political pique or fiscal constraint, would be felt in Norway. Even less visible American actions could have important repercussions. For example, a reduction in the number of USAF wings might mean that fewer units were available to reinforce Europe, or the reliance on more USAF reserve or Air National Guard units might mean that the reinforcement schedule would have to be extended. The loss or delay of even one unit committed to Norway would result in a strong reaction from the government. All other things being equal, Norway would probably seek greater commitments from the U.K. and or perhaps Germany to compensate for any loss.
- *A START agreement that reduces ICBMs disproportionately more than sea-based systems.* Situated next to the Kola Peninsula, Norway is highly sensitive to any increase in Soviet reliance on SSBNs. If the United States and the Soviet Union signed a strategic arms accord that led to a greater Soviet reliance on SLBMs—even if SLBMs were reduced—the Soviet Union would probably place even greater emphasis on protecting its SSBN fleet. Similarly, if the B-1, B-2, and cruise missiles are not reduced or eliminated, the importance of air defense in the far north will grow. These situations would probably result in an increased Soviet military presence on the Kola Peninsula and an increased Soviet determination to deny NATO use of Norway's northern airbases in wartime. Any major increase in Soviet conventional military forces in the region could undermine Norwegian security and defense policy.
- *Increased assertiveness of Soviet naval strategy in the far north.* From the mid-1960s through the mid-1980s, Soviet naval deployments and exercises in the Norwegian Sea increased enormously, causing Norway to seek greater

reinforcement commitments from its allies. Since 1985, Soviet naval activity dropped off considerably. Yet in early 1989, the Soviets deployed two new major warships to the Kola Peninsula: an aircraft carrier and a new type of missile cruiser, the largest ship in the Soviet fleet. Norwegian and NATO officials are still uncertain what this all means, but they are coming to conclude that the Soviet maritime threat is less than they once thought. However, if the Soviet Northern Fleet resumes a more active profile in the Norwegian Sea, the Norwegian public may become more willing to accept American naval deployments in the region.

- *Reduction in Soviet military forces in the far north.* The converse of the two previous cases holds as well: If Soviet conventional forces on the Kola peninsula are reduced, Norwegian threat projections will decrease. Support for defense spending would fall and calls for a smaller American presence in the region would increase. Reductions in forces in Central Europe would have some influence on public opinion, but far less on elite opinion.

One change not mentioned above is internal change in the Soviet Union. In my opinion, Norwegian policy is not terribly sensitive to changes in internal Soviet behavior per se, but only insofar as it affects external behavior. Norwegian policy has changed at the margins over the years, but the basic tenets of Norway's policies laid down in 1948 have held consistently through many changes in the Soviet Union. The events of late 1989 certainly have helped to reduce tensions in Europe, as have a more open Soviet society and a more Western approach to diplomacy. However, if Soviet forces on the Kola remained unchanged in strength or doctrine, then Norwegian security policy would probably remain unchanged as well. The Norwegians may even protest if they feel that reductions in tensions elsewhere in Europe are not being reflected in the far north.

Policies of Other NATO Nations

Of the other NATO countries, Denmark holds the greatest potential to directly influence Norwegian security policy. If Denmark should take the lead on some issues—for instance, an effective ban on nuclear-armed ships, or official approval of an NNFZ—Norway would undoubtedly be pressed to follow. The security affairs majority in the Storting have tended to be somewhat more cautious on these matters than their counterparts in the Danish Folketing. Still, the pressures to follow the Danish example could prove to be irresistible.

A change in British policy involving the Northern Region would be strongly felt in Norway. British reinforcements hold an important place in Norwegian security policy; they provide powerful forces to the defense of North Norway without the potential destabilizing effect (in Norwegian eyes) of American forces so close to the Soviet Union.⁹ Norway could not easily compensate, politically or militarily, for a reduction or elimination of this British commitment. Such a change would force Norway to reconsider the basis of its security policy.

Germany remains the biggest wild card in Norwegian policy. Norwegian attitudes toward events in Germany still seem mixed, but are becoming more accepting. Norwegians are eager to reduce tensions in Europe and would be willing to pursue the prospects of a reunified Germany. At some point, however, Norway would need to see a reduction in tensions and forces in the far north, not simply in Central Europe. Since the far north involves Soviet territory and Central Europe does not, the issues involved will be fundamentally different. The latter area would, of course, be the major concern for the Germans, while the former would be of much lesser concern. Norway could find itself facing the question of whether to follow Germany's lead or to resist so as not to be left behind in its own security interests.

CONCLUSIONS

Norwegian politics are entering a period of unprecedented instability and divisiveness—at least by Norwegian standards. The forces of instability will always be held in check in Norwegian national politics by the constitutional prohibition against dissolving the Storting and by the Norwegian preference for calm deliberate debate. Still, the next several years could witness previously unknown turmoil in Norwegian politics. In this environment, Norwegian security policy and its relations with the United States and NATO, hitherto consistent, could become more unpredictable.

⁹For an in-depth treatment of the question of reinforcements in Norwegian policy, see Lund, 1989.

V. CONCLUSIONS

The rapidity of change in Europe at the end of the 1980s makes any attempt to predict the course of events for the early 1990s extraordinarily difficult. Security issues that seemed major concerns a few months ago have been overshadowed by even bigger events. Yet, despite these qualifications, one can, with some confidence, make some meaningful statements about the future of Danish and Norwegian security policies and their effect on the United States.

Perhaps the most important point to keep in mind is that despite all the political changes in Europe or that appear on the horizon, geography has not changed. The United States will remain a maritime power, and Norwegian and Danish territory will control major portions of the sealanes. Even if NATO as we know it were to disappear, the United States would be driven to seek some security arrangement with these countries. Therefore, the United States should take special care in managing its relations with these nations, especially in issues involving naval forces and naval arms control despite any other changes that occur in Europe.

A related point involves the importance of intra-Nordic relations to Denmark and Norway. As the military threat to Europe appears to decrease and the rationale for the NATO alliance appears to some people to diminish, the appeal of "Nordic" solutions to security issues can be expected to grow in the region. The United States should not underestimate the potential appeal of a regional agreement that addresses the security concerns of the Nordic countries but locks out the United States and the rest of the NATO alliance. If the feeling grows that NATO is superfluous, the probability of regional agreements excluding the United States will grow.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Archer, Clive, "Denmark: The Bomb and the Ballot," *The World Today*, August-September 1988.
- Auslund, John, *Myths of Nordic Security Policies*, The Norwegian Atlantic Committee, Security Policy Library No. 4, Oslo, 1987.
- _____, *Nordic Security and the Great Powers*, Westview Special Studies in International Security, Westview Press, Bolder, Colorado, 1986.
- _____, *Deterrence and Reassurance in Northern Europe*, Centrepiece 6, Centre for Defence Studies, Aberdeen, Winter 1984.
- Bitzinger, Richard A., "Competing Security Doctrines and a Nordic Nuclear-Free Zone," The RAND Corporation, P-7502, November 1988.
- _____, *Denmark, Norway, and NATO: Constraints and Challenges*, The RAND Corporation, N-3001-RC, November 1989.
- Bjøl, Erling, "Denmark: Between Scandinavia and Europe," *International Affairs*, Vol. 62, No.4, Autumn 1986.
- Discriminate Deterrence*, Report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, Fred C. Iklé and Albert Wohlstetter, co-chairmen, The Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, Washington, D.C., January 1988.
- Dorfer, Igemar, "Scandinavia & NATO: à la carte," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 9, Winter 1986.
- Faurby, Ib, "Denmark: No Simple Formula for Security," *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, November 1988.
- _____, "Government by Opposition: Denmark and the New Missiles in Europe," *Scandinavian Review*, Vol. 72, Summer 1984.
- Fouquet, David, "Denmark sets a tough nuclear test," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, May 7, 1988.
- Haagerup, Niels J., "Denmark's View on NATO and Other Security Issues," *Scandinavian Review*, Vol. 32, Winter 1984.
- _____, "Scandinavian NATO Without Nuclear Weapons?" *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 9, Winter 1986.
- Hagard, John H.M., *Nordic Security*, Occasional Paper Series No. 6, Institute for East-West Security Studies, New York, 1987.
- Hegge, Per Egil, "The View from Oslo," *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, Vol. 31, No. 4, July 1986.

Heginbotham, Stanley J., "The Forward Maritime Strategy and Nordic Europe," *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 38, No. 6, November-December 1985.

Holst, Johan Jorgen, "The Military Build-up in the High North. Potential Implications for Regional Stability: A Norwegian Perspective," *Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt notat* No. 318B, April 1985.

_____, "Norway and NATO in the 1980's," [a lecture to the American-Scandinavian Foundation. New York, May 23, 1984] *Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt notat* No. 301B, May 1984a.

_____, "Norway's Search for a Nordpolitik," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 60. No. 1, Fall 1981.

_____, "Norwegian Security Policy for the 1980's," *Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt rapport* No. 76, December 1982.

_____, "A Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in the Nordic Area: Conditions and Options—A Norwegian View," *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, Vol 14. No. 3, 1983.

_____, "The Pattern of Nordic Security," *Daedalus*, Spring 1984b.

_____, *The Security Pattern in Northern Europe: A Norwegian View*, Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt, Oslo, June 1986, NUPI notat Nr. 356.

Holst, Johan Jorgen, Kenneth Hunt, and Anders Sjaastad (eds.), *Deterrence and Defense in the North*, Norwegian University Press, Oslo, 1985.

Huitfeldt, Tonne, "Defence of Scandinavia," *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, Vol. 31, No. 6, October 1986a.

_____, "NATO's Northern Security," *Conflict Studies*, No. 191, 1986b.

Huldt, Bo, "The Strategic North," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 8, No. 3, Summer 1985.

Jenkins, Chris, Olav Trygge Storvik, and Will Fowler, "Norway—facing the Soviet threat," *Defence*, Vol. 18, No. 7, July 1987.

Lund, John, *Don't Rock the Boat: Reinforcing Norway in Crisis and War*, The RAND Corporation, R-3725-RC, July 1989.

Norway, Royal Ministry of Defense, Press Information Department, "Abstract of the 'Main Guidelines for the Defense Establishment During the Period 1984-1988' (Unofficial Translation based on: St. meld. nr 74 (1982-83) Hovedretningslinjer for Forsvarets virksomhet i tiden 1984-1988)," 1983.

Norwegian Atlantic Committee, *The Military Balance in Northern Europe*, Oslo, 1986.

Nyberg, Rene, "Security Dilemmas in Scandinavia: Evaporated Nuclear Options and Indigenous Conventional Capabilities," *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 19, No.1, March 1984.

Petersen, Nikolaj, "The Security Policies of Small NATO Countries," *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 23, 1988.

Stark, James, "Norway," in William J. Taylor and Paul M. Cole, *Nordic Defense: Comparative Decision Making*, D.C. Heath & Co., Lexington, Massachusetts, 1985.

Wallin, Lars B. (ed.), *The Northern Flank in a Central European War*, Proceedings of a Symposium, Stockholm, November 4-5, 1980, The Swedish National Defence Research Institute, Stockholm, 1982.

Zeiner-Gundersen, H.F., et al., *NATO's Maritime Flanks: Problems and Prospects*, Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, Washington, D.C., 1987.